kernel.org compromised

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Read it yourself…</p>
  1. ———- Forwarded message ———-
  2. From: J.H. <[email protected]>
  3. Date: 2011/8/29
  4. Subject: [kernel.org users] [KORG] Master back-end break-in
  5. —–BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE—–
  6. Hash: SHA1
  7. Afternoon Everyone,
  8. As you can guess from the subject line, I've not had what many would
  9. consider a “good” day.  Earlier today discovered a trojan existing on
  10. HPA's personal colo machine, as well as hera.  Upon some investigation
  11. there are a couple of kernel.org boxes, specifically hera and odin1,
  12. with potential pre-cursors on demeter2, zeus1 and zeus2, that have been
  13. hit by this.
  14. As it stands right now, HPA is working on cleaning his box, and
  15. I'm working on hera (odin1 and zeus1 are out of rotation still for other
  16. reasons), mainly so that if one of us finds something of interest, we
  17. can deal with it and compare notes on the other box.
  18. Points of interest:
  19. – – Break-in seems to have initially occurred no later than August 12th
  20. – – Files belonging to ssh (openssh, openssh-server and openssh-clients)
  21. were modified and running live.  These have been uninstalled and
  22. removed, all processes were killed and known good copies were
  23. reinstalled.  That said all users may wish to consider taking this
  24. opportunity to change their passwords and update ssh keys (particularly
  25. if you had an ssh private key on hera).  This seems to have occurred on
  26. or around August 19th.
  27. – – A trojan startup file was added to rc3.d
  28. – – User interactions were logged, as well as some exploit code.  We have
  29. retained this for now.
  30. – – Trojan initially discovered due to the Xnest /dev/mem error message
  31. w/o Xnest installed; have been seen on other systems.  It is unclear if
  32. systems that exhibit this message are susceptible, compromised or not.
  33. If you see this, and you don't have Xnest installed, please investigate.
  34. – – It *appears* that 3.1-rc2 might have blocked the exploit injector, we
  35. don't know if this is intentional or a side affect of another bugfix or
  36. change.
  37. – – System is being verified from backups, signatures, etc.  As of right
  38. now things look correct, however we may take the system down soon to do
  39. a full reinstall and for more invasive checking.
  40. – – As a precaution a number of packages have been removed from the
  41. system, if something was removed that you were using please let us know
  42. so we can put it back.
  43. – – At this time we do not know the vector that was used to get into the
  44. systems, but the attackers had gained root access level privileges.
  45. That's what we know right now, some of the recent instabilities may have
  46. been caused by these intrusions, and we are looking into everything.
  47. If you are on the box, keep an eye out, and if you see something please
  48. let us know immediately.
  49. Beyond that, verify your git trees and make sure things are correct.
  50. – – John ‘Warthog9' Hawley
  51. Chief Kernel.org Administrator
  52. —–BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE—–
  53. Version: GnuPG v1.4.11 (GNU/Linux)
  54. Comment: Using GnuPG with Fedora – http://enigmail.mozdev.org/
  55. iEYEARECAAYFAk5a5U0ACgkQ/E3kyWU9dif+1ACfYPlgq/keFrFO77AmQVduKGwx
  56. TAcAnRAu6nHt74+5aC+fPeb8aT0hcy2K
  57. =Semd
  58. —–END PGP SIGNATURE—–

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